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How Important is Welfare Dependence?
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a theoretical model of welfaredependence, in which
current participation in AFDC induces greater futureuse of the program. One
prediction is duration dependence in welfare spells. This istested using 6
years of monthly data on time spent in the AFDC programamong female household
heads in the control group of the Seattle/Denver IncomeMaintenance Experiment.
A variety of duration dependence models areestimated, investigating the effect
of different functional form assumptions, as wellas the impact of accounting
for time-varying covariates, competing risks, and dataheterogeneity in the
estimates. Monthly AFDC participation does not showstrong evidence of duration
dependence. In fact, during the initial months on theprogram the probability
of leaving the program, conditional onpast participation, appears to be flat
or increasing. After about eight months the probability ofleaving starts to
decrease, but it becomes virtually flat after 18 to 24 months.There is some
indication that there are two distinctgroups that utilize welfare: one group,
which has a very low probability of leaving welfareand whose rate of exit
changes little over time; and a secondgroup, which is more affected by time on
the program.The propensity of black women to experiencelonger AFDC spells
appears totally due to their lower probability of leaving AFDC via
marriage, rather than any difference in leaving viaearnings or other income increases.
However, even where duration dependence ispresent in the data, this is
not adequate evidence for program-induced welfaredependence.The final part
of the paper presents a model of earningschange and AFDC participation which
contains no welfare dependence effects. Welfarespells simulated from this
model show duration dependence effects whichappear quite similar to those
observed in the actual data.
Rebecca M. Blank
Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 085441.INTRODUCTION
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program continues to
generate controversy.At the heart of the discussion are questions regarding
the effect of this program on the behavior of participants. A well-established
literature exists, measuring the short-run impact of the program on labor
market behavior and household composition of eligible households1 however, in
recent years it has been suggested that the more serious effect is a long-run
one, typically referred to as "welfare dependence."In this paper, welfare
dependence will refer to a situation in which current participation in AFDC
increases the probability of future participation.This paper is a study of
the extent to which such program-induced welfare dependence occurs among AFDC
participants.
Using six years of monthly information on female-headed household behavior,
the primary result of this study is that current monthly AFDC participation
does not appear to be strongly affected by past AFDC usage. First, the statis-
tical evidence for duration dependence in welfare spells is weak. In fact,
during the initial months of AFDC, the probability of leaving the program,
conditional on past participation, appears constant or increasing. After about
eight months the conditional probability of leaving starts to decrease, but it
becomes virtually flat after 18 to 24 months. At least part of this decrease
is due to a mixing of heterogeneous populations. There is some indication that
there are several distinct groups that utilize welfare: one group, which has a
very low probability of leaving welfare and whose rate of exit increases slowly
over time; and a second group, which is more affected by time on the program.
Second, this paper shows that statistical duration dependence is not sufficient
proof of welfare dependence.A simple model of income generation, with no
1program dependence effects, can produce simulated welfare spells which exhibit
similar duration dependence to that observed in the actual data.'
These results contrast with existing literature on AFDC duration. A number
of previous studies have found significant duration dependence, using annual
data on AFDC spells. This is interpreted as explicit evidence of welfare
dependence.
The next section of this paper describes the existing econometric litera-
ture on the dynamics of AFDC participation. The third section presents several
theoretical models of welfare dependence. The fourth section develops the
empirical tools necessary to estimate a time-dependence model of welfare
spells. The fifth section of the paper presents AFDC duration estimates based
on a variety of different functional form assumptions. Models incorporating
heterogeneity and competing risks are also discussed. The sixth section
presents a simple model of income generation, uses it to create simulated
welfare spells from the data, and compares the resulting duration effects with
those estimated in the actual data. The last section discusses the relationship
between these results and the existing literature, and indicates some of the
questions that this study leaves unanswered.
22. PAST RESEARCH ON WELFARE DEPENDENCE
The bul.k of the literature on AFDC participation focuses on point-ir -time
decisions within cross-sectional data.2It is only in the past few yais that
a literature on the dynamics of AFDC usage has emerged. Two early papers by
Hutchins [1981] and Plotnick [1983] estimate transition models of movements in
and out of AFDC using relatively simple econometric techniques, and ignoring
many problems of spell censoring.Bane and Eliwood [1984] provide a more
complete descriptive picture of patterns of welfare use, using the PSID data
set over a 12 year period. They do some simple multivariate analysis on spell
length using discrete logistic models. Ellwood [1986] has updated these
results with 15 years of PSID data, focusing on recidivism and multiple spells.
O'Neill, Bassi and Hannan [1984] provide an comparable analysis to Bane and
Ellwood, both repeating their analysis on the PSID and using the NLS Young
Women's Survey over an 11 year time period. O'Neill, Bassi and Wolfe [1985]
present discrete duration dependence models of AFDC spell length from the NLS.
These last four papers all discuss the issue of duration dependence in
welfare spells (although it is not a primary focuss of the papers by Ellwood
and Ellwood and Bane), explicitly assuming that duration dependence implies
welfare dependence. Unfortunately, they reach somewhat conflicting conclusions.
Bane and Ellwood find significant duration dependence in their data, although
Ellwood's more recent work finds somewhat smaller, but still significant,
effects.In contrast, O'Neill, et. al. finds virtually no evidence of duration
dependence, even when using similar PSID data. Ellwood [1986] criticizes these
results, indicating that they are due to a inappropriate definition of AFDC
spells.3All of the above studies indicate that demographic characteristics
have an important influence on spell length, younger black women with young
3children being the least likely to leave welfare quickly. In addition, leaving
welfare via marriage appears quantitatively different from leaving via earnings
increases.
This paper extends the analysis of these studies in several ways. First,
the existing literature is entirely empirical and does not attempt to explicitly
define and model welfare dependence. Second, this literature relies on
relatively simple discrete empirical models to estimate duration effects. The
econometric literature provides a variety of more sophisticated ways of
approaching duration dependence issues, emphasizing the importance of testing
distributional assumptions, using continuous time models, and accounting for
heterogeneity in the population.4
Third, these studies all rely upon annual data.5 This provides information
only on whether a household received any welfare over the year, with no
information about the timing of AFDC receipt. Thus, a household could receive
welfare in January of one year, be off for 22 months, and receive welfare in
December of the following year, and this would be counted as a continuous spell
of welfare.6 The use of annual data can be expected to produce longer and more
continuous spells on AFDC than occur in reality. A major contribution of this
paper is the use of six years of monthly AFDC data in the investigation of
duration dependence.
Finally, earlier research makes no attempt to relate the empirical
findings on duration dependence to any causal models of income generation and
welfare participation. This paper will simulate a simple model of income
change, which indicates that duration dependence (declining hazard rates) may
result even in the absence of AFDC dependence effects.
43. MODELS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE
The term "welfare dependence" is frequently used in discussions of the
AFDC program within the popular media, but it is rarely defined. The existing
academic literature is largely empirical, and has not provided a theoretical
model of how welfare participation is affected as time on welfare increases.
The standard model of AFDC participation is based on a utility comparison
between the utility obtainable by participating in AFDC (Us,)and utility
obtainable by not participating in AFDC (Un). Let=- U.A household
chooses to participate if I >0. If household utility is determined by
household income and leisure (or hours of work) of the head, then I will be a
function of the range of variables which affect labor market opportunities and
leisure/labor choice.This point-in-time model of the welfare participation
decision can become the basis for a dynamic model if it is assumed that a
household regularly reassesses its current AFDC status, entering or leaving
AFDC if the utility comparison has changed.
There are two ways by which current participation in AFDC can have an
impact on future AFDC participation choices, First, current participation may
change future values of the labor market and household variables that enter the
utility function.Second, participation in AFDC may enter directly into the
utility function, changing the shape or location of the utility curves.
To describe the first effect, there are two sets of variables that welfare
usage may affect over time.First, welfare use may change the labor market
opportunities available to a household head in the future.The most obvious
channel by which this could occur is through reductions in labor market
experience. It is well known that welfare participation reduces labor supply.
Thus, a woman using AFDC in time period t works H hours, where H*t <H,the
5hours she would work in the absence of the AFDC program.If a woman is on
ttn * welfarefrom t to t+n, her experience decreases by (H -H )dueto welfare
participation. Experience may enter the utility function in several ways. It
is typically assumed that experience positively affects wage rates, so workers
with less experience have poorer wage opportunities. (To the extent that
low-skilled women tend to take jobs where past work experience matters little,
this effect may not be very large.)It is also possible that experience may
influence a woman's knowledge of the labor market and of job availability.
There is evidence that one of the strongest effects of job placement and
training programs for welfare participants occurs by providing information on
where jobs are located (Danziger [1981]).
Second, the use of AFDC may change household composition in a way which
makes future welfare use more likely. There is an ongoing controversy over the
extent to which welfare usage decreases marriage and divorce rates, and
increases family size.The best evidence appears to indicate that AFDC has
little impact on number of children, but does have a small positive impact on
divorce rates.9The effect on marriage rates has not been well-determined,
largely because it is very difficult to separate out AFDC effects from other
social and cultural changes. Since this issue is not the primary concern of
this paper, let me simply say that jf participation in AFDC creates marriage
disincentives or increases household size, then the program increases the
probability of future welfare use by these women.1°In most states, married
couples are ineligible for AFDC or face much stricter eligibility requirements.
But even if eligibility were not an issue, single parenthood decreases household
income opportunities and thus makes welfare participation a more attractive
option.To the extent that AFDC participation encourages the continued
6maintenance of single-parent households, then AFDC raises the probability that
these households will use welfare in the future.
However, while AFDC participation may change the labor market and household
circumstances of participants and lead to greater future welfareuse, this is
not the model which many people have in mind when they refer to welfare
dependence. An alternative story claims that use of AFDC changes household
tastes over time so that people come to rely on and prefer AFDC income to labor
market income. This requires a model where AFDC participation changes the
labor-leisure choice locus.
There are two ways of conceptualizing this form of welfare dependence.
First, one can consider a shift in the location of utility curves over time,
and second, one can consider an actual change in the curvature or shape of the
utility curves.In these models welfare dependence may occur even when AFDC
hasno impact on the labor market or demographic variables that enter the
utility function.
Shifts in the location of utility curves can be thought of as changes in
the magnitude of "stigma effects." Moffitt [19831 has modeled welfare choice
by including an additional term, S, into the utility comparisondefined
above. S refers to an underlying "distaste" for welfare, which Moffitt calls
stigma.Thus, the decision to participate in welfare can be written as '=
U,-S-Un .AFDCis chosen if >O. To put this into a dynamic context, consider
that all terms are time subscripted and assume that St is a function ofpast
t
time spent on welfare, W*,whereW*,,, =EI and I is an index function equal 0
to1 when>O and equal to 0 when I￿O. If dS/dW* <0,then exposure to the
AFDC program over time decreases an individual's "distaste" for theprogram,
shifting the utility function upward, and raising net utility with welfare
7relative to the utility available without welfare. This situation is depicted
graphically in Figure 1.
The alternative to conceptualizing welfare dependence as a locational
change in the utility function, is to assume that the curvature of the utility
function changes over time.Utility is frequently parameterized as U(H,Y,X),
where H is hours of work (negative leisure), Y is income, and X is a set of
household characteristics that are assumed to determine the shape of the
underlying function.An increasing "reliance on welfare" can be considered
equivalent to shifting the utility function in favor of greater leisure and
flattening the labor/leisure tradeoff. Thus at time period t, the utility
available on welfare is U(H* ,Y ,X ,W ),whereH* ,Y ,andX are the hours
of work, income, and household characteristics of a household that participates
in welfare in time period t, and W*is defined above.Utility of nonpar-
ticipants is U(H ,Y ,X, ,W').(Pastwelfare participation affects the shape of
the underlying utility and thus enters all utility functions.) The decision to
participate on welfare is based on the comparison
=U(Ht,Y*,X*,W*)
—
If>O then welfare participation is chosen. The effect of W can be
characterized as d(dU/dH)/dW* <0, and d(dU/dY)/dW* <0, implying that as time on
welfare increases, hours of work appear more onerous relative to the additional
income that they produce. Figure 2 depicts such a change.
This paper empirically tests the proposition that time spent on welfare
increases the probability of continued welfare participation, holding constant
all variables which are normally assumed to influence utility choice (including
labor market opportunities and household composition.) If I find that AFDC
usage affects participation probabilities even with these other variables held
8constant, I can inLerpret this as evidence supportive of those models in which
AFDC usage influences the shape or location of the utility function independent
of its effects on other variables. Of course, to the extent that I am not able
to control fully for all other variables, I will not be able to distinguish
between the above models.
Before turning to an econometric representation of this model of welfare
dependence, let me highlight two important issues. First, the sum of
previous periods on welfare may not be an accurate representation of how
previous welfare usage influences current usage.It may be that only recent
AFDC participation affects future welfare use; or that past spells are important
but have less of an impact than current welfare spells. Because of the economet-
ric difficulties of dealing with multiple spells (and because I have less data
on multiple spells),I will assume that only the current spell of welfare
influences the length of that spell. This is discussed further below.
Second, there may be many variables which influence welfare participation
behavior which I cannot measure or observe. In this case, evidence that past
welfare usage influences current welfare usage may be due to these unmeasured
variables, and not due to the impact of AFDC itself.This is the classic
problem of population heterogeneity versus program impacts. If all individuals
have the same probability of entering welfare initially (perhaps because of
random bad luck in the labor market or the marriage market), but if certain
individuals are less motivated than others, then the more motivated individuals
will be more likely to leave welfare sooner. A measured "duration dependence"
effect of AFDC may simply be due to the fact that over time, the group who are
on the program longer are composed of an increasingly greater percentage of
less-motivated individuals. In this situation, concluding that welfare depen-
9dence occurs and is induced by the AFDC program is inaccurate.The longer
welfare usage of less-motivated individuals is due solely to their own innate
characteristics, which were fixed before they entered AFDC. This is a serious
problem in virtually all models of duration dependence, and I will use the
existing statistical techniques that are designed to uncover the presence of
unmeasured heterogeneity. However, at some level, this problem cannot be
conclusively resolved and all my results must be interpreted with this in mind.
4. ECONOMETRICALLY MODELLING WELFARE DEPENDENCE
This section provides the econometric background to the empirical results
of the next section. The analysis of time-dependent data has become increasing-
ly common in economics. Among the best background papers are Flinn and Heckman
[1981] and Heckman and Singer [1984a]. Texts, such as Kalbfleisch and Prentice
[1980], are also available. Therefore, this section will lay out the economet-
rics of state dependence quite briefly, focusing on the issues of importance in
analyzing AFDC participation duration.
Let F* (t,X) represent the cumulative distribution of time spent on
welfare, where X,,is a time-dependent vector of household characteristics,
labor market opportunities and parameters of the AFDC program. F*is the
result of a set of participation decisions, + through +, characterized in
Section 3 above. f(t,X) is the associated density function. Let F(t,X) =1
-F(t,X) be the survival function, the percent surviving (still on welfare)
at time t. Define the instantaneous rate of leaving welfare at T=t, condition-
al upon participating to time t, as the hazard rate h(t), where
(1) h(t,X) urn
8t40
=f(t,X)/(F(t,X ))
10= -dlog(F(t,X))/dt.
Integrating, it is clear that
+
(2) F(t,X) =exp(-Ih(u,X)du)and
(3) f(t,X) =h(t,X)exp(-çh(u,X)du).
Thus, choosing a hazard function, h, is equivalent to choosing a distribution
for t.
Note that time-dependence in the exogenous (X) variables makes this
integration more complex. However, if time-varying covariates are present, and
the researcher replaces them with constant covariates (such as beginning-of-
spell values) this can induce significant bias into the results (Flinn and
Heckman [19811.) Children's ages and household size will vary over a welfare
spell, as do area labor market opportunities, the parameters of the AFDC
program, andincomesources such as alimony or unemployment compensation.
The models of welfare dependence developed in the previous section imply
that the hazard rate -- theconditional probability of leaving welfare as time
on welfare increases --shoulddecrease over time, ceteris paribus.The
absence of such an effect will provide evidence against the existence of
program-induced welfare dependence. Given a data set containing information on
the length of AFDC spells, the likelihood that any individual is observed to
use welfare from time 0 to time t is simply f(t,X ).Ifthe data is right
censored, i.e., if the individual starts a spell of welfare at time 0 and at
time T when data collection ends the individual is still participating in
welfare, the probability of that censored event is simply the value of the
survival function at T, F(T,XT). (Left censored observations are omitted from
the sample, as discussed below.) Thus, the estimated likelihood function for
the entire population is
114.
(4) r f (t,X )' F(t,X )
wherethere are n1 completed spells of welfare observed and n2 right censored
spells.
The choice of the appropriate functional form for the hazard function is a
much-debated topic. Most commonly, people choose hazards which integrate into
tractable functional forms for the distribution, F(t,X). Since the results
may vary with functional assumptions, I will compare a variety of parametric
and nonparametric distributional assumptions for the hazard in the empirical
work below.
POPULATION HETEROGENE ITY
The potential for unobserved heterogeneity among the sample population was
discussed above. If there are variables which I cannot include in theexogenous
vector of characteristics, and which are correlated with AFDC usage, I will
derive inappropriate estimates of duration dependence if this heterogeneity is
not taken into account. Heckman and Singer [1984a} prove that the presence of
population heterogeneity induces a negative bias in the hazard function,
potentially producing estimates of a decreasing hazard when the true underlying
hazard is flat or increasing. To account for heterogeneity, write the hazard
function as h(t,X ,), where e represents a set of unobservable variables. The
density of the underlying distribution of time spent on welfare is
(5) F(t,X ,e) =exp(-fh(u,XO)du) g(e)de,
where g(8) is the distribution of the underlying unobservables. Given both a
distribution for t and a distribution for e, one can estimate the density F.
However, even more uncertainty exists over the appropriate distributional
characterization of 8 than exists over the appropriate distribution for t.1
Most commonly, some form of a mixing distribution is assumed, in which the
12parameters that characterize the size and shape of the hazard function are
allowed to take two or more values, and these values, as well as their associat-
ed probabilities are estimated as part of a maximum likelihood procedure. (See
Heckman and Singer [l984a, 1984b].)I will describe below the exact form of the
heterogeneity model estimated in this paper. However, it should be noted that
the results will be dependent upon the form of heterogeneity which is assumed.
With respect to the issue of time spent on welfare, the concepts of
duration dependence and heterogeneity are rather inextricably linked in the
data, and at some level it is not clear that attempting to separate them out
makes a great deal of sense.It is quite possible that AFDC usage changes
preferences by affecting these unobservable variables (such as motivation.) In
this case, what we observe as duration dependence in the data may indeed be due
to differences in the unobservables -- butthese unobservables themselves are
changed by the AFDC program. Alternatively, since we do not observe all women
from their very first spell of welfare, but have a cross section of women over
a given six-year period, it is possible that exposure to AFDC prior to the
beginning of the sample is the cause of the existing heterogeneity. In this
case also, controlling for the heterogeneity does not eliminate a "bias" from
the true duration effect, but rather eliminates a duration dependence effect
that appears to be part of the unobservable only because our observation period
for welfare spells is too short. The conclusion is that while the heterogeneity
adjustments provide interesting additional information about the duration data,
they are difficult to interpret; the duration estimates done in the absence of
heterogeneity corrections may be the appropriate results to consider.
COMPETING RISK MODELS
Once participating in the AFDC program, there are several ways by which to
13leave. A woman can take a job which raises her income above the AFDC eligibi-
lity boundary; she can experience an increase in non-labor income (such as
alimony or disability assistance) that puts her above the income eligibility
limit; her children can pass age 18, eliminating her AFDC eligibility; or she
can marry, also eliminating her AFDC eligibility. It is not clear that these
ways of leaving AFDC should all be modeled in a similar manner. The determin-
ants of leaving AFDC via marriage may be quite different from the determinants
of leaving by increased earnings. This situation can be handled with a
competing risk model, in which there are multiple ways for a welfare spell to
terminate, each characterized by a different hazard function. Let h1 (t,X ) be
the hazard function associated with leaving welfare via an earnings increase,
and h2 (t,X) be the hazard associated with leaving via another route. Then the
overall probability that a woman will end a welfare spell at time t, given it
has lasted from time 0, is
(6) hcr(t,Xt)h1(t,X.) + h2(t,X).
The survival function in a competing risk model becomes
(7) F (t,X) =exp(-hr (u,X )du).
0
The distribution of a completed spell that ends for reason m (ml,2) is
(8) fm(t,Xt) =hm(t,X)exp(-rha(u,X)du).
0
Thelikelihood function for the sample is
(11 vt_
(9) 'Tif1(t,X )rf2 (t,X )'iiF rk (t,X )
wheren1 individuals leave welfare via earnings increases, n2 individuals leave
via other changes, and n3 individuals are censored.
ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONAL ASSUNPTIONS FOR THE HAZARD
As noted above, estimated duration models are often quite sensitive to the
functional form assumed for the hazard function. As a result, I will compare
14estimates based on a variety of different assumptions. This section briefly
presents each of the four hazard functions that are used below.
(a) eibu11 Distribution. Because of its mathematical ease, the most
commonly used form for F(t,X )isa Weibull distribution.In this case the
hazard function is12
(10) h(t,X) =p*exp(J3)*(exp(yJ3)*t)P
1
(The constant, 13 ,providesa measure of the second Weibull parameter, lambda.)
If p<l (p>l) the Weibull hazard monotonically decreases (increases). If p=l
the Weibull collapses to the exponential distribution which is characterized by
a constant hazard.
(b) Log-Logistic Distribution. The log-logistic is computationally
convenient and more flexible than the Weibull. Its hazard function is
(11) h(t,X) =p*exp(X3)*(exp(y13)t)P'1(1 + (exp(X13)*t)P).
If p>l,the log-logistic hazard increases from zero to a maximum at
t(p-1)1 "/exp(B0 ),anddecreases thereafter.
(c) Flinn-Heckmart Hazard. Flinn and Heckman use a form for the hazard
function which they derive from a particularly flexible general function.In
their data applications, this becomes
(12) h(t,X) =exp(130+ t1t + t2t2 + X13).
Typically used with t and t-squared, this imposes a clear quadratic form on the
hazard, although higher powers of t can be included, of course.
(d) Continuous Stepwise Nonparametric Hazard. To allow the data as far as
possible to reveal the underlying hazard without imposition of a functional
form, I estimate a simple stepwise hazard, allowing the hazard function to take
on a series of constant values as t increases:
.15(13) h(t,X) =c1if t2, h(t,X)c6 if
h(t,X) =c2if h(t,X)c7 if
h(t,X)c3 if h(t,X) =c8if
h(t,X) =c4if h(t,X) =c9if
h(t,X) =c5if
where c1 exp(1301 +KB).'3A larger number of steps were tried, but nine
appears to fit the data reasonably well. Increases in the number of steps do
not change the estimates of 13, and significantly increase the cost of estima-
tion. This stepwise hazard is completely non-parametric, and I will rely on a
comparison between it and other hazard models to determine how well the others
describe the data.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF DURATION MODELS
The data used in this study is the control group from the Seattle/ Denver
Income Maintenance Experiments (SINE/DINE).'4 The SINE/DIME Monthly Composite
provides monthly information on income and labor market variables for a 6 year
period, 1970-1975 in Seattle and 1971-1976 in Denver. From the control group I
extract all women who head households containing children under the age of 17
at some point during the 6-year period.This is the group of potential AFDC
users.There are 1121 such women in the sample. Of this group, 714 receive
AFDC income for at least 1 month over the sample.While I can observe most
women for the entire 72 months15, few are female heads with children (i.e.,
potentially eligible for AFDC) throughout the sample. Changes in marital
status and household composition take women out of the eligible category.
While 72 months of data is a significant length of time over which to
16observe household behavior, it is still a shorter time period than one would
ideally want. Because I have no pre-sample information in the data, any spells
which are in progress in the first period are left censored and are omitted
from this analysis.16 Thus, I am limited to spells that start within the time
period of the sample. The results will necessarily be biased by lack of
information on very long spells --theyare either both right and left censored
and do not appear in the data at all, or they are right censored and provide
only limited information to the likelihood function.
This section estimates duration models of AFDC receipt using the first
observed spell of welfare for each household starting within the sample period.
There are 508 such spells in the data, of which 185 (36%) are right censored.
The analysis assumes that only the current spell on welfare affects spell
duration. Of course, for households in the midst of multiple spells this may
not be a good assumption.'7
Table 1 provides information on the distribution of these welfare spells.
Column 1 looks at the length distribution of the 323 completed spells. 15% of
them end within 2 months while 62% end within a year after they start. (The
average length is a little over a year.) Column 3 indicates the length of the
185 censored spells. While Table 1 shows evidence of a large number of short
spells, no conclusions on spell length can be drawn from it, since both
completed and censored spells must be jointly accounted for to adequately
estimate expected duration.
One justification given for using annual data to study AFDC dynamics is
that women may move in and out of AFDC for one or two months due to administra-
tive problems, and these should not be counted as real AFDC spell endings. In
my data there is little evidence of this. Out of 605 total observed spell
17endings in the data, in only 20 cases do women return to AFDC after 1 month.
In 16 cases they return after 2 months, and in 14 cases they return after 3
months.In other words, while there are some women experiencing only short
periods off AFDC, this is not a predominant pattern. Furthermore, if one looks
at the 50 short spells off AFDC, 29 of them are readily explainable: the
household clearly has increased income in these months, either through employ-
ment, or because of increases in other income sources. Thus, there is little
evidence of "welfare churning" in this data, and little justification for
assuming that brief periods off welfare are not real spell endings.18
Table 2 looks at the causes behind spell beginnings and endings. 40% of
the spells begin immediately after a change in marital or household status;
only 8% begin with the birth of a child. 52% begin within a household that was
already potentially eligible (i.e., female-headed with children) before ?LFDC
receipt began.
Looking at spell endings, 36% of the spells are censored, and I therefore
do not know how they end. In 18% of the cases women get married and in 7% of
the cases their children grow past the age of eligibility. 39% of the cases
leave AFDC although they remain female-headed households. These are the cases
which either work their way off AFDC or who find other sources of income.
Table 3 presents the means of the variables used to estimate AFDC spell
duration. Variables which do not vary over a spell are race, education, and
age at the beginning of the spell. The remainder of the variables can change
as the spell progresses. In Table 3, I report the mean numbers of children and
other income at the beginning of the spell, and the mean unemployment rate and
maximum benefit payment over the entire 6 years. Other income refers to
non-AFDC, non-labor market income. For these women it is small (about-
18$28/month), and mainly composed of alimony payments, and other sources of
public income such as social security or disability payments. Unemployment
rates are for the Seattle and the Denver SMSAs. Benefit maximums are specific
to each household size in Washington or Colorado. These vary annually if state
legislatures readjust the rates, and they vary monthly as they are impacted by
inflation. For both states they tend to decrease over time, as inflation
erosions are larger than legislative increases. All inflation adjustments are
based on the CPI for the Seattle SMSA, or on the average urban CPI for the
nation (for Denver data, which lacks its own CPI during these years.)Table 3
shows a population that is disproportionately non-white and poorly educated,
with little outside income support.
Table 4 presents estimates of the probability of exit from an AFDC spell,
using the four functional forms for the hazard presented above. Five of the
variables in the estimation (children under 6, total children, other income,
unemployment, and benefit maximums) are explicitly allowed to vary over time.2°
All functional forms show quite similar coefficient patterns for the seven
exogenous variables.2' Age and education of the head have significant and
positive effects (i.e., they increase the probability of leaving welfare.)
Race has a significant negative effect.The impact of children is negative,
but only the total number of children shows significance. Other income
significantly increases the probability of leaving welfare, while the unemploy-
ment coefficient is negative but uniformly insignificant.The maximum AFDC
benefit payment is generally positive, a counterintuitive result, but the
coefficients are insignificant. While other research typically finds that
benefit levels are very important in determining welfare participation, much of
the power of this variable comes from the large differences in benefit levels
19across states within a national data sample.I have observations from only two
locations, within which the variance in benefit levels over time is relatively
small.2 2
The Weibull distribution has a P parameter of .92, very close to one.
(Recall that P1 in a Weibull distribution implies a constant hazard.) Thus,
the Weibull indicates only weak duration dependence in the data.A graph of
the hazard function (Figure 3) confirms this.23 After a small initial fall,
the conditional probability of leaving welfare is almost flat.(Note that the
hazard rates graphed in figures 3 through 9 are directly interpretable as the
conditional probability of leaving AFDC in a given month, expressed in percent-
age terms.)
In contrast, the log-logistic distribution has a P of 1.26, which in this
distribution indicates a rising hazard (a increasing probability of leaving
welfare) for 6 months, and a falling hazard thereafter. Figure 4 graphs this
function. The likelihood value indicates that the log-logistic distribution
fits the data much better than the Weibull.
The Flinn-Heckman hazard shows a somewhat different duration pattern: the
hazard rate decreases from the first month, but after 45 months it levels off
and begins to slowly increase, as Figure 5 shows. This pattern appears largely
due to the restrictions of the quadratic form on the time variable.I have
experimented with the inclusion of higher orders of the time variable in the
model. While third or fourth order terms are not significant, their inclusion
does decrease the magnitude of the upturn induced in the data by the quadratic
time variable.24The Flinn-Heckman distribution is inferior to the log-
logistic in overall fit.
Given the divergence in duration results between the three distributionally
20defined hazards, the nonparameteric stepwise hazard should provide useful
additional information on the true form of the underlying data. As described
above, this model allows the data to fit its own hazard function across 9
constants. The estimated hazard function (see Figure 6) appears closest to the
log-logistic hazard. The hazard remains essentially flat for the first 8
months, then decreases, but soon flattens out and is essentially constant after
18 months. The likelihood value confirms the similarity between the log-
logistic and the nonparametric estimates.
There are several conclusions from Table 4.First, it is clear that
household characteristics are very important in determining how quickly a woman
will leave welfare. White women who are older when their welfare spell starts,
who have higher education, who have higher alternative sources of income, fewer
children and fewer young children move off welfare faster. These results are
entirely consistent with earlier research. Table 5 uses the coefficients from
the non-parametric stepwise distribution in Table 4 to simulate the effect of
changes in race, education and number of children on expected spell length and
exit probabilities from AFDC.This table further confirms the importance of
household characteristics on AFDC usage.
Second, functional assumptions are clearly very important and produce
different patterns for the hazard function. Among the parametric distributions,
the log-logistic clearly fits the data best, and produces results very similar
to the nonparametric estimates. This makes the log-logistic an appealing
functional form, particularly since it is much less computationally expensive
than the nonparameteric stepwise estimates (which must estimate 9 parameters to
describe the hazard, rather than just 1.)
Third, the hazard rate which best fits the data, is one which is flat (or
21rising) for about the first 8 months of welfare use. This falls between 9 and
18 months and then is essentially constant for all longer spells. Recall that a
flat or rising hazard contradicts any assumption of welfare dependence.
However, a falling hazard for some period of time after the initial months on
welfare is consistent with a welfare dependence story, in which several months
of participation in AFDC creates reliance on the program.
ADDING HETEROGENEITY TO THE MODEL
As noted above, the observed fall in the hazard rates may be due to
differences in the unobservable characteristics of households. If one group
has a high probability of leaving welfare and a second group has a low probabi-
lity of leaving, over time those on welfare will be more and more likely to
belong to the second group. A single estimated hazard rate will appear to fall
over time as the AFDC population mix changes, even if there are no dependence
effects for either population. Using the above results, I shall assume that
the underlying hazard rate is log-logistic, and characterize population
heterogeneity in a nonparametric manner.
Assume that the unobservable is reflected in the constant, so that n
heterogeneous groups will have constants e1 ..e.The probability that an
individual is in any group i is ii1,whereZ =1.The appropriate hazard
rate for a member of group i is thus
(14) h(t,x ,e) =p*exp(e1+XJ3)*(exp(9+XB)*)P1
I will estimate a heterogeneity model in which there are three groups, whose 13
coefficients are identical, but whose constants vary. The probability that an
individual is in group 1 or 2 will be estimated as ¶1and¶12 .(113=l-111T2)2
S
Table 6 presents the results for this heterogeneity model. The coeff 1-
22cients on the exogenous variables are quite similar to those presented in Table
4.However, the allowance for different underlying constants clearly produces
evidence of significant heterogeneity.Individuals are quite likely to fall
into the first group (probability 52%) or the second group (probability 38%).
There is only a small chance they will be in the third group (probability 9%).
The likelihood function indicates that this model fits the data better than the
simple log-logistic model in Table 4 with no heterogeneity.
Figure 7 graphs the three hazard functions resulting from the estimates in
Table 6. (Recall this graph is constructed for the mean individual. Hazard
rates for women with different characteristics would show similar patterns, but
different magnitudes.) If an individual falls into the first group, she enters
AFDC with virtually no probability of leaving, and has a very slowly increasing
hazard which remains low throughout the 72 months.Clearly this group --a
majority of the population --willrely on welfare a long time. However, there
is no evidence of duration dependence in these spells; i.e., there is no
evidence that this long-term usage is related to time on the program.
If the individual is part of the second group, she is increasingly likely
to leave AFDC in the first few months (the hazard rises to over 15%); but after
10 months over 60% of this group is off welfare and the hazard begins to fall
steadily, down to around 5%.The last group, which is least common in the
data, leaves AFDC very early and very fast; their initial probability of
leaving is well over 50%.Over 90% of this group is off welfare within 4
months. The hazard falls precipitously at this point, as the few that remain
then leave more slowly. The falling hazard rates in these last two groups may
be interpreted as consistent with the welfare dependence models presented
above. However, the fact that the hazard begins to fall only after the majority
23of each group has left welfare creates the suspicion that this hazard could be
created by a model with no welfare dependence effects at all. Once the
majority of a population has crossed an income threshold, it is statistically
quite common (given an underlying distribution in propensity for income change)
for the remainder to cross it more and more slowly.This possibility will be
discussed further below.
The problem with heterogeneity models, of course, is that there is noway
to identify which group an individual belongs to -- thedistinction is based on
an assumed unobservable variable (all observable variables are already included
in the estimation.) It appears that there is some large group which enters
AIFDC with virtually no alternative opportunities, for whom the possibility of
leaving improves slowly over time, but who will be on welfare a long time.
There are other groups who do have ways of escaping AFDC early, but who become
less and less likely to leave AFDC as time passes. At least part of the falling
hazard estimated in Table 4 is due to the mixing of these differentgroups, not
to program dependence effects.Better understanding of these results will
require better data which allows exploration of the nature of that which is
currently being termed 'unobservable.'t
A COMPETING RISK MODEL
Given the uncertainty of interpretation with the heterogeneity results, an
alternative specification is to estimate a competing risk model. In some
sense, the competing risk model is a very restricted form of heterogeneity, in
which heterogeneous groups are explicitly identified by the manner in which
they leave AFDC. Unfortunately,neither the simple log-logistic model of
Table 4, nor the heterogeneity model of Table 6 are nested within the competing
24risk model, thus the likelihood functions will not be directly comparable.
As before, I choose to work with a log-logistic specification for the competing
risk hazard functions.2
Table 7 presents estimates of a three-way competing risk model. The first
hazard is estimated for those who leave AFDC when they marry. The secondgroup
leaves welfare through an earnings increase, although their potential eligibi-
lity continues (i.e., they remain female-headed households with children). The
third group also remains female-headed, but leaves via some other change than
earnings.2
The coefficients on the exogenous variables differ significantly across
these three groups. The likelihood of leaving AFDC through marriage is
strongly and positively affected by age and strongly negatively affected by
unemployment and race.This is consistent with other evidence showing that
poor black women are less likely to marry.In contrast, the probability of
leaving AFDC by earnings increases is primarily affected by education level and
number of children.Being nonwhite has little effect on the probability of
this type of spell ending -- thenegative effects of race in the earlier
aggregate models appear to have been solely due to the lower propensity of
black women to marry, rather than their lower probability of leaving welfare by
other means.This is a result with potentially important policy implications.
Since the third group is a mixture of "other reasons for leaving" it is not
surprising that few explanatory variables are significant. Only other income
shows positive effects, indicating that women with high other income sources
while on welfare are more likely to leave through future increases in this
income.
The three hazard rates estimated in these competing risk models are
25graphed in Figure 8 for the mean individual. The hazard rate for the probabi-
lity of leaving AFDC via marriage is very low and virtually flat. The probabi-
lity of leaving by other means is also low (although higher than marriage.) It
decreases slightly over time. In contrast, the probability of leaving AFDC via
income increases is higher, especially in the initial months, and falls
steadily, from about 1.8% to 1%. Overall, the competing risk estimation
clearly indicates that the process of leaving AFDC through household changes is
quite different from leaving via an income change, both because of differences
in the coefficients, and differences in the shape of the duration parameters.
Note that the hazard rates are additive in the competing risk model (each
individual is "at risk" of each of the categories), which means that the
magnitude of each hazard rate will necessarily be lower on average than those
estimated in previous models.
The hazard rate of most interest in the competing risk model is that for
leaving welfare via earnings increases.28While the hazard rates in earlier
models showed some increases in the early months on AFDC,thecompeting risk
hazard for earnings change clearly has no such property. The hazard decreases
steadily over time, although the rate of decrease is very small.The lack of
an initial "rising period" in the competing risk earnings hazard seems puzzling
in relation to the earlier estimates.However, there are reasons to believe
that the competing risk estimates are somewhat less reliable. First, each
hazard rate in the competing risk model is estimated on much less data (only
those who leave via that category.)This means that the earnings hazard is
determined primarily by those 108 spells which end with earnings increases;
this is probably not enough spells to adequately determine the shape of a 72-
period hazard rate.29 Since the hazard rates in Tables 4 and 6 were estimated
26from a much larger set of data, they should be more reliable.
Second, one can calculate a goodness of fit measure to compare the
estimates in Tables 6 and 7 (given at the bottom of these tables).This is
based on a Pearson chi-squared statistic, comparing the actual versus the
predicted number of people who either complete a spell of a given length, or
are censored after a given period of time (144 potential categories.) The
heterogeneity model has a clearly lower goodness of fit number, indicating that
the predicted fit from this model is closer to the pattern of the actual data.3°
Several conclusions result from the estimates in Tables 6 and 7.First,
there is evidence that some significant degree of heterogeneity exists in the
data. This is one reason for falling hazard rates in the aggregate data.
Second, for a significant number of people (group one in the heterogeneity
estimates, and those at risk of marriage or other changes in the competing risk
model) there is no evidence of time-dependent effects in their propensity to
leave AFDC.For these AFDC participants, the data do not support a model of
welfare dependence. Third, for other groups, the conditional probabiLity of
leaving AFDC does vary over time. It may be flat or rising in the early months
on the program, but in all models, there is some significant portion of time
over which the hazard rate falls for some AFDC participants. For these groups,
this falling hazard is consistent with a welfare dependence story.Finally,
the parameter estimates from the competing risk model indicate that race is an
important variable in explaining welfare usage because it is correlated to
different marriage probabilities, not because of its effect on other variables.
6. A SIMJJLAThD MODEL OF AFDC PARTICIPATION WITHOUT DEPENDENCE
We started this paper by asserting that a declining hazard was consistent
27with a model of duration dependence.Had we found no evidence of declining
hazards, that would have been a strong argument against welfare dependence as
we have defined it.However, we have found evidence that hazard rates for
leaving AFDC do decline, although not over all spell lengths and not for all
individuals. The next step is to ask whether this is sufficient evidence to
conclude that some degree of welfare dependence exists. I will investigate
this question by building a model of income change which is unaffected by
participation in AFDC.I can simulate expected income over time for each of my
AFDC households from the SINE/DIME data. The AFDC participation decision will
be based on a simple comparison of whether simulated income is above or below
the breakeven point.31 This will produce a set of simulated welfare spells.
This requires moving from the purely data-descriptive techniques of hazard
rates, to an explicit model of income dynamics.If the hazard rates which
describe the data in the above models can be duplicated in the simulated data
without assuming any time-dependence effects of welfare participation, then
those declining hazards are not sufficient proof of welfare dependence.3 2
Assume that earned income moves over time according to the autocorrelated
model:
(15) =Yperm+ e, where e =ae.1 + v
Y is earned income in period t; Yperm is long-run expected permanent earned
income; and v is a normally distributed random error term with mean zero. In
this model, earnings diverge from their long-run level as random shocks occur
and slowly die out over time.Given a starting value, e1 ,anestimate of
Yperm, and estimates of a and cc, the variance of v, I can generate a stream of
income expectations for a household.If the starting point for the model is
the first month of AFDC participation, the expected income for a household in
28each succeeding period can be generated and compared with the AFDC cut-off
point for that household. When expected income crosses the cut-off point, the
leave AFDC.This creates a sample of simulated AFDC
spells; the estimated hazard from these
the hazard estimated from the actual
have no welfare dependence effects; the
is unaffected by AFDC participation.
The attached appendix contains a
for this simulation are produced and
Briefly, I use estimates for a and o
Yperm is calculated for each household,
monthly earnings of a sample of female
do not participate in welfare.(Yperm
household characteristics which enter
Households are assigned their actual observed earned income in the first month
on AFDC (Y1). Income in the second period is calculated using equation (15),
where e1 =Y1-Yperm. A random number generator which selected from a normal
distribution with variance was used to generate values for the random income
shock, v, in each period.
For much of my sample, this model implies that an AFDC spell starts with a
large negative "shock't to income. (Many women have zero earnings during their
first month on AFDC, so Yl-Yperni-Yperm.) Over time, the earnings stream
should converge back towards Yperm. An AFDC spell ends when estimated income
exceeds the estimated breakeven point for a household. Spells are censored if
they are still in progress when the SINE/DIME sample period is over. (Each
spell is assumed to start at its actual calendar time.)
29
household isassumed to
simulated spells
data. Note that
generated stream
can be compared with
these simulated spells
of household earnings
description of how the starting values
describes the simulation more fully.
derived from a very similar data set.
using coefficients estimated from the
-headed households in the SIME/DIME who
is determined by the typical set of
most human capital wage equations.)The spells generated by this simulation are summarized in Table 8, which
can be compared to the actual data in Table 1.188 spells were censored (very
close to the 185 censored spells in the actual data.) The expected length of a
completed spell is somewhat longer in the simulated data (20 months) than in
the actual data (13 months).
This simulated spell data is used to estimate a log-logistic model of AFDC
duration, identical to that presented in Column 2 of Table 4.The results of
this estimation are in Appendix Table A. Given the nature of the simulation,
it is not surprising that most exogenous variables have insignificant coeffi-
cients. Figure 9 provides a graph of the resulting hazard function.For
comparison, Figure 9 also graphs the earnings hazard from the competing risk
model and the hazard function from the simple log-logistic model in Table 4.
The hazard function resulting from these simulated welfare spells isvery
revealing.The hazard has a somewhat similar shape to that estimated by the
log-logistic model in Table 4, although it starts at a lower point and rises
more slowly. It rises for 24 months, then falls steadily throughout the rest
of the period.34 The reason behind this decline is clear; a significant number
of AFDC participants cross the income threshold out of AFDC in the initial
months, but over time, those who are left cross at a decreasing rate. Those
whose permanent income is close to (or below) the breakeven point, or those who
receive further negative income shocks, remain on AFDC longer.Over the range
in which it decreases, the rate of decrease is very similar to the decrease
observed in the earnings hazard from the competing risk model; the two lines
essentially parallel each other at different magnitudes.
The primary conclusion from this simulation is that a declining hazard has
no necessary relationship to welfare dependence. Indeed, a very simple model
30of income change with no AFDC dependence effects can produce a declining hazard
that is somewhat similar to those hazards estimated from models using actual
data.This simulation casts doubt on whether the fact that hazard rates do
decline for some participants over certain spell lengths, providesany evidence
of welfare dependence. It also calls into question previous studies of welfare
dependence which take declining hazards to be proof that welfare dependence
exists.
7. FINAL COMMENTS
A few comments need to be made on the interpretation of these results and
their relationship to previous work on welfare dependence. In comparison to
Bane and Eliwood, Ifind shorter spells of welfare use3and less evidence of
duration dependence. Many of the estimated hazard rates in thispaper show
either no evidence of duration dependence, or show only avery moderate
decrease over time. In large part, this is probably due to the use of monthly
data versus annual data, which smooths together multiple spells of welfare. In
addition, these differences must also be due to the shorter time period ofmy
data and the focus on single spells of welfare.If Ellwood is correct in
finding greater duration dependence over a longer time period, then results
from multi-spell models should show more evidence of duration dependence.
The simulation results in this paper indicate the danger of drawing causal
inferences from purely data-descriptive techniques. Even the presence of
significant duration dependence in welfare spells may not reflect any program-
induced effects. This highlights the need to build and test explicit causal
models of welfare participation in future research.
It is important to note that one should interpret the results in this
paper as indicating that few women stay on welfare a long time.In fact, the
31heterogeneity estimates indicate that the probability of leaving AFDC is very
low for more than half of the sample; these women will clearly rely on welfare
as a long-term source of income support. The primary point of this paper is
that these long spells are not created nor lengthened by the use of AFDC
itself.The results of this paper indicate that the welfare population is
exceptionally diverse (a conclusion also emphasized by Eliwood), with some women
leaving welfare quickly, while others have few non-welfare opportunities.
Further evidence of the fact that some women have few options outside welfare
comes from the calculation of permanent income which I made for every household
in order to complete the simulation in the previous section. For almost 1/3 of
the households, estimated permanent income levels were below AFDC breakeven
levels.
Finally, this study also emphasizes the close links between AFDC usage and
household composition change --particularlymarriage and remarriage rates.
This issue deserves a great deal more research attention than it has received.
Until we have better models of household formation and change, we will be
unable to estimate better causal models of AFDC recipiency.
321. For instance, see Moffitt [1983], Ellwood and Bane [1984], or Blank [1985].
2. See Moffitt [1983] or Blank [1985]. Plant [1984] looks primarily at single
participation decisions, but has some multi-period analysis.
3. When Ellwood redoes his analysis using O'Neill, et. al. 's definitions for
AFDC spells, he eliminates most (but not all) of the differences in results.
4. The use of discrete duration models may be particularly questionable when
the welfare spell is based on annual data, a clear aggregation.
5. One exception is a study by Feaster, Gottschalk and Jakubson [1985] which
uses monthly information on AFDC recipients in Wisconsin to investigate the
impact of the 1981 legislative changes on length of AFDC spells.
6. Bane and Ellwood [1985] and Eliwood [1986] test the effect of not counting
years when the amount of welfare received is very small and find little change.
in their results.
7. Of course, it would be preferable to have monthly data available for as long
a period of time as the annual panel studies. My data will provide less
information on multiple spells and on long spells, but It should provide more
precise information on AFDC usage within the six year period that it covers.
The prospect is bleak for obtaining a longer sample of monthly data than the 72
months available here. The newly-developed SIPP panel follows households for
36 months before rotating them out of the sample.
8. An exception is Gottschalk [1986], who investigates the impact of tax and
transfer levels on welfare duration in a dynamic model.
9. The most complete study of this issue is Ellwood and Bane [1984].For a
discussion of earlier literature, see Bishop [1980] and McDonald and Sawhill [1978].
10. Note that this paper only deals with a situation where actual time spent on
AFDC affects these variables. An alternative model might assume that it is the
potential availability of AFDC which affects marriage propensities. This
requires a different set of empirical tests and is not addressed in this paper.
11. In particular, one cannot produce nonparametric estimates of both g(e) and
f(t); at least one of the distributions has to take an explicit assumed form.
Heckman and Singer suggest letting the unobservable take a nonparametric form.
This is the approach used in this paper. However, Trussell and Richards [19851
indicate that this is just as subject to distributional biases as when the
distribution of t is estimated nonparametrically.
12. For the remainder of this section,I drop the time subscripts on the X
vector for notational simplicity.
13. This is the equivalent of estimating a set of exponential distributions (in
which the hazard is constant) over different values of t. One could also
arrive at this model by replacing the continuous time variables in (12) with
33dummies for different values of t.
14. SIME/DIME was not a random sample of the populations but had an upper-income
cutoff point at about median income. This will exclude all women who were in a
high-income household at the start of the sample. Since I am interested only
in AFDC spells, to the extent that few women move from high-income households
onto AFDC, this will not greatly affect my results. SIME/DIME also excluded
those for whom labor market participation was not possible (such as the
disabled.)
15. There are some who leave the sample early, including migrants. Moving from
the control group into the experimental group is also considered equivalent to
leaving the sample in this study.
16. While there are techniques to adjust for left-censored data, they are
cumbersome and often arbitrary.
17. While I observe some multiple spells in my data, I choose not to work with
them. First, they are highly selected, since the sample length permits only
short-duration, closely spaced multiple spells to appear.Because I have no
information outside of the 6-year sample period, I have no basis on which to
treat the observed multiple spell participants differently from other partici-
pants, whose earlier or later spells may be censored or outside the sample.
Second, the appropriate model for multiple spells requires a model of time both
on and off AFDC (so that the probability of re-entering AFDC for a new spell
can be estimated.) This is more than a simple 2-state model, since time off
AFDC may include marriage,, higher earnings, periods without children, etc.
Given the complexity of this task, together witi the data problems, this paper
is limited to an analysis of single spells.
18. I have eliminated the remaining 21 inexplicable short spells off welfare by
recoding the data to show a continuous spell. (The results are unaffected by
this recoding.)
19. The data in Table 2 were derived by looking at various causal variables for
6 months before a spell began and 6 months after it ended. Changes in marital
or household status or in number of children were coded first. In the remaining
data, if both labor market and other income changed, coding was determined on
the basis of which involved the larger dollar change.
20. When these five variables are set at their beginning-of-spell values and no
time variance is allowed, quite different coefficients are estimated, both in
value and significance. Likelihood values are significantly lower without
time-varying exogenous variables.
21. The coefficient values across columns in Table 4 are similar, but since
each column is based on a different functional form, they are not directly
comparable.However, elasticity estimates for the variables also show very
similar patterns across all functional forms. This is not surprising, as the
exogenous variables enter each distribution in a similar manner, through the
term exp(I3X).
3422. This variable also appears to act partially as a proxy for differences
between the two locations. If a dummy variable is included for location in
Seattle, its coefficient is insignificant, but the coefficient on benefit
maximums becomes even smaller.
23. Figures 3 through 9 graph the hazard rates for a black woman in Seattle of
mean age (27), mean other income ($28/month), with 11 years of education and
two children, one age 3 and the other age 7.Unemployment and benefit maximums
are also set equal to their mean levels, so the graphs indicate expected hazard
rates for the mean individual, holding all exogenous variables constant.
24. The lack of many spells longer than 45 months means that thislong-term
upturn in the hazard is very imprecisely estimated.
25. Increasing the number of groups results inconvergence problems. Using
only two groups, I have tested for heterogeneity in the shape parameters (the
p's) and in the 13's.There is no evidence of heterogeneity in the 13's. One
can estimate a two-group model in which both the constants and the p'svary
(this model will not converge for three groups.) However, the resulting two
hazard rates look very much like those presented here:one is virtually flat
and very low, and the other peaks sharply at a high level and then falls
rapidly. Probability weights are evenly spread between the twogroups. This
estimate is not presented since it does not provide a great deal of additional
information to the three-group model with varying constants shown here.
26. Since there is no heterogeneity in this model, one coulduse a non-paramet-
ric procedure.However, the number of simultaneously-estimated parameters in
the competing risk model is large, and adding. multiple shapeparameters for
each hazard would require unacceptably large amounts ofcomputer time and money.
27. This includes those whose income increases by non-earned incomechanges,
those whose children leave home, and those whose reasons forleaving are unknown.
28. The virtual flatness of the hazards for exiting AFDC throughmarriage or
other changes indicates that there is no issue of time dependence in these
types of exits.
29. I have attempted to estimate a competing risk model, with heterogeneity in
the probability of leaving via earnings increases. This model has serious
instability problems, largely related to the very few observations from which
it is trying to estimate heterogeneity effects within the earnings hazard.
30. This measure isE (Actual -Predicted1)2 /Predicted1 ,i1,144. Note
that while this measure is indicative of the comparative fit of both models, it
is not a reliable statistic since its distribution is unknown. It does not
provide a X2 statistic since it does not account for the fact that the predicted
model is based on estimated parameters. Unfortunately, with thecensoring in
the data, individuals each have a different number of periods during whichthey
are "at risk". Good of fit statistics which correct for the this problem (see
Heckman [1983]) all require symmetrical data, in which each individualcan
potentially fall into every cell.
3531. This is similar to the model of AFDC participation that is presented in
Ashenfelter [1983], and tested empirically with annual data in Plant [1984]. It
is also similar to the model of income change developed in Lillard and Willis [1978].
32. Ideally, one would like to be able to directly translate a causal model of
income generation into an estimable hazard model. This is typically not
possible. Most dynamic models of income change require a set of flexible
correlations between time periods.There are no easily estimated functional
forms which allow for intercorrelations between more than 2 or 3 time periods.
33. This model allows women to leave AFDC only through earnings increases. I
have not allowed for the probability of leaving through marriage or other
changes, largely because there is no obvious way of jointly modeling marriage,
divorce, fertility and income changes.My primary interest will thus be in
comparing the shape of the generated hazard, not its magnitude.
34. One reason for the longer rising hazard in the simulated data is that the
simulation does not allow large and sudden jumps in income, such as often
happens when a woman finds a job.In the actual data, many of the early
leavers seem to experience such jumps in the first few periods on welfare.
35. Eliwood and Bane calculate a mean expected spell length of 5.2 years-.
Ellwood, using somewhat revised data, calculates a mean length of 4.4 years.
My mean length (Table 5) is 3.1 years.
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SPELL DISTRIBUTION IN THEMONTHLY
SINE/DIME DATA
Completed First Observed Spells Censored First Observed Spells
Number Cumulative Number Cumulative
Time Completed In: %CompletedIn: Censored After: %CensoredAfter:
2 months 47 15% 10 5%
6 months 125 39% 31 17%
12 months 201 62% 56 30%
24 months 267 83% 103 56%
36 months 302 93% 133 72%
48 months 316 98% 158 85%
60 months 320 99% 175 95%
72 months 323 100% 185 100%
Expected length of completed spells: 13.3 monthsTABLE 2
BEGINNING & ENDING REASONS FOR FIRST OBSERVED SPELLS
BEGIN}JING REASONS
Number Percent
Enter AFDC When Household Eligibility Statys Changes 244 48%
Change in Marital or Household Status 205 40%
Increase in Number of Children 39 8%
Enter AFDC from Previously Eligible State 264 52%
Decrease in Headts Labor2Narket Income 138 27%
Decrease in Other Income 60 12%
Unable to Determine Reason 66 13%
Total First Observed Spells 508 100%
ENDING REASONS
Number Percent
Censored 185 36%
Leave AFDC When Household Eligibility Status Changes 127 25%
Change in Marital Status 91 18%
Decrease in Number of Children 36 7%
Leave AFDC While Still Eligible 196 39%
Increase in Headts Labor2Market Income 108 21%
Increase in Other Income 51 10%
Unable to Determine Reason 37 7%
Total First Observed Spells 508 100%
1lncludes both divorces/separations and individuals whomove out of another
household (typically their parents'.)
2Other Income includes all household incomeexcept labor market income of the head
and public assistance.
—1—TABLE 3
DATA NEANS
SINE/DINEDATA, FIRST OBSERVED SPELLS
SINE DINE TOTAL Variable Subsample §mle
VariablesConstant Over Spell:
Age at Start of Spell 29.4 26.3 27.9
Race (1 =Non-white) .58 .45 .52
Years of Education 11.1 10.8 11.0
Variables Which Vary Over Spell:
Number of Children <Age61 .82 1.00 .91
Total Children <Age171 1.98 2.04 2.01
Other Income Per Nontji1'2 $30.46 $26.99 $28.78
Unemployment Rate3 9.4% 3.8% 6.6%
Benefit Naximum Per Honth4 $238 $179 $208
Number of Observations 262 246 508
1Neasured at startof spell.
2Other Incomeincludes all household income except labor marketincome of
the head and public assistance. Inflationadjusted.
3Mean forsample period. The Unemployment Rate is thereported
unemployment in the Seattle and Denver SMSA's,respectively.
4Shown is themean for a family of 3 for the sample period for the
states of Washington and Colorado. Inflationadjusted.TABLE 4
DURATION tIODELS OF FIRST OBSERVED WELFARESPELLS
With Time Varying Covariates
(Number of Observations =508)
Variable Functional Form
Nonparametric
Weibull Log-logistic Flinn-Heckman Stepwise
Hazard Hazard Hazard Hazard
Constant 4.345** -4.063** -3.719**
1
(.506) (.576) (.494)
Age .018** .017** .016** .016**
(.007) (.008) (.007) (.007)
Race -.257** -. 259** -.213* -.213*
(1 =Nonwhite) (.123) (.135) (.115) (.114)
Education .060* .060* .055* .055*
(.033) (.039) (.031) (.031)
Number of -.083 -.064 -.096 -.093
Children <6 (.095) (.103) (.089) (.087)
Total Number -. 240** -. 316** -.171* -.164*
of Children (.113) (.130) (.111) (.107)
Other Income .0004** .003** .0004** .0003*
(.0002) (.001) (.0002) (.0002)
Unemployment Rate -.003 -.005* -.002 -.002
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Benefit Maximum .003 .006* .002 .002
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Distributional Parameters
P .924** 1.256**
(.042) (.057)
Time —.O39**
(.013)
Time Squared .0004*
(.0003)
Likelihood Value -1381 -1368 -1372 -1369
Mean of Survival 21 18 21 22
Function (in months)
**Significant at the 10% level.
Significant at the 2% level.
Standard Errors in Parentheses.
1Stepwise Hazard includes 9time-varying constants as described in text. All
are significant at a 2% level.T
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 Table 6
DURATION MODEL OF FIRST OBSERVED WELFARE SPELLS
WITH HETEROGENEITY AND TIME-VARYING COVARIATES
(Number of Observations =508)
Shared
Variable Coefficients Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Constant _4.812** _3.126** -1.702**
(.440) (.445) (.459)
Age .019**
(.007)
Race -.199*
(1— M.-.... I 1(r\ — LL.'YLLLL.) . 1U)
Education .069'"
(.028)
Number of -.078
Children <6 (.084)
Total Number -.156*
of Children (.099)
Other Income .002**
(.001)
Unemployment Rate -.004*
(.002)
Benefit Maximum .002
(.002)
P (Distributional 2.571**
Parameter) (.255)
Probability of .527** .380** .093**1
being in group (.038) (.040) (.030)
Likelihood Value -1358
Mean of Survivor Function
(in months) 54 8
Goodness of Fit Measure 197
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 2% level.
Standard Errors in Parentheses.
1Calculated from the probabilities forgroups 1 and 2.TABLE 7
DURATION MODELS OF FIRST OBSERVED WELFARESPELLS
WITH THREE—WAY COMPETING RISKS AND TIME-VARYING COVARIATES
(Numbers of Observations =508)
Variable Log-Logistic Hazard
Spells Ending Spells Ending Spells Ending
with with Earnings with Other
Marriage Increase Changes
Constant _3.989** _7.818** _5.360*
(.700) (1.039) (.957)
Age .029** -.003 .019
(.011) (.016) (.016)
Race _.738** .134 -.005
(1 =Nonwhite) (.298) (.269) (.027)
Education .027 .243** -.017
(.053) (.090) (.082)
Number of -.004 -.216 -.052
Children <6 (.014) (.193) (.226)
Total Number -.168 -•543* -.201
of Children (.153) (.417) (.613)
Other Income .001 .002 .005*
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Unemployment Rate -. 009** -.001 .001
(.004) (.007) (.009)
Benefit Maximum .001 .010 .004
(.004) (.008) (.012)
P (Distributional 1.200** 1.012** .953**
Parameter) (.087) (.078) (.090)
Likelihood Value -1698
Mean of Survivor Function
(in months) 20
Goodness of Fit Measure 226
.,Significant at the 10% 1eve1.
Significant at the 2% level.
Standard Errors in Parentheses.TABLE 8
SPELL DISTRIBUTION OF SIMULATED SPELLS
Completed Spells Censored Spells
Number Cumulative Number Cumulative Time Completed In: ¼CompletedIn: Censored After: ¼CensoredAfter:
2 months 28 9% 6 3%
6 months 53 17% 22 12%
12 months 109 34% 44 23%
24 months 227 71% 82 44%
48 months 305 95% 146 78%
72 months 320 100% 188 100%
Expected length of completed spells: 19.6 months.Appendix
APPENDIX
A SIMULATION MODEL OF INCOME CHANGE AND AFDC PARTICIPATION
The model of income generation is a simple autocorrelated procedure,
(Al) Y =Yperm+e,wheree =cxe-1 + v
Simulated income for each household is generated starting with the first period
when they enter AFDC. In this first period their earned income is set at its
actual value (Y1).
Yperm for each household is estimated by using those households in June of
1973 (the mid-point of the sample) who were female-headed but did not receive
AFDC.Earned income among this sample was estimated with a maximum likelihood
equation in which the probability of labor market participation and monthli
earnings were estimated simultaneously. The coefficients from this estimation
were used to calculate expected earnings among each AFDC household (conditional
upon participation) as an estimate of Yperm. (These estimates were adjusted for
price changes between June 1973 and the months when the household was on AFDC.)
Estimates of a, the autocorrelation coefficient, and civ, the standard
error of the random term v, were taken from Ashenfelter and Card [1985], who
have a very similar sample of earners. Their research estimates the structure
of earnings from a national sample of low-income women between the years 1970
and 1975, who participate in the CETA program in 1976. Their data was annual.
Their estimated autocorrelation coefficient is .791, which translates into a
monthly coefficient of .98.They find that 71.5% of the variation in income
over time was due to random variation.Calculating 71.5% of the variance in
income among my sample over time, I arrive at an estimate for ci. of 89.65.
(This is in dollars per month.)
1Appendix
In order to set the income generation process running, I need an estimate
of e1 ,the"shock" to income occuring in the first period when thesewomen
enter welfare. I assume that this is equal to Y1 -Yperm, the difference between
actual and predicted earnings in this first period.
With these parameters, earned income in the second period on welfare
becomes
(A2) Y2 =Yperm+ e2 where e2 =e1+ v2
v2 is generated from a number generator which selects from a normal distribu-.
tion, based on a zero mean and a standard error of 89.65.
In a similar fashion, I can generate earnings expectations from period 2 into
the future.
Total income in each period is simply
(A3) Ytot =Y+ Yoth, + Benefit
where Y is the earnings generated by the above model in period t, Yoth, is the
observed other income of the household (provided in the data), and Benefit is
calculated according to the formula
(A4) Benefit =BenMx-t,,(Y -30.+ Yoth ).
BenMxis the benefit maximum for the household's size and location. T is the
participant tax rate, calculated according to the formula used in Blank [1985].
The 30 represents the $30 set-aside in effect during this time period for AFDC
participants. Clearly, as a household nears the breakeven level, Benefit
approaches zero.
The AFDC breakeven point occurs where Benefito. It is assumed that each
household is on AFDC as long as t, (Y -30+Yoth) is less than BenNx. In the
time period when this is no longer true, the household is assumed to leave
2Appendix
AFDC, ending their welfare spell. Spells are assumed to begin in their actual
calendar time, thus any household which has not left AFDC by the end of the
SINE/DIME sample period is counted as censored.
Table 8 in the text presents a summary of the AFDC spells generated by
this model. These spells are used to estimate a standard log-logistic model of
welfare duration.The results of this estimation are presented in Appendix
Table A. Few of the exogenous variables are significant, not surprising since
they have only indirect effects on spell length (through their effect on the
estimate of Yperm, and on the estimate of Benefit .)
3